澳门六合彩

This installment of the Saddam Files introduces nearly 300 pages of original Arabic documents that were captured during the 2003 Iraq War and accompanying English translations, along with the transcripts and translations for ten audio tapes of Saddam Hussein鈥檚 meetings. These disparate materials were organized and consolidated into twenty files that were part of the archive previously available at the Conflict Records Research Center. Part of the archive was obtained by Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and Steve Coll in a settlement with the US Department of Defense and later donated by Coll to 澳门六合彩鈥檚 History and Public Policy Program.

Chemical Warfare

滨谤补辩颈听chemical warfare was a grim, iconic feature of the聽. As the conflict dragged on, Iraq鈥檚 use of chemical weapons聽.听

This post introduces two files and one audio tape related to chemical warfare that were recently added to the Saddam Files on 澳门六合彩 Digital Archive. The first is a聽 about a June 27, 1985, training exercise during which Iraq gassed one of its own units, unbeknownst to the frontline soldiers exposed to the poison. With the exercise carried out for the purpose of 鈥渙vercoming the psychological barrier to chemical weapons exposure,鈥� the report notes the circulation of the rumor among Iraqi troops that such weapons 鈥渕ay possibly be used by the enemy.鈥� While this might have reflected anxieties that the Islamic Republic of Iran would act on聽its threats to build and use chemical weapons against Iraq in kind, the exercise, which was officially deemed a success, was likely based on more immediate and practical considerations.听

Revealingly, one after-action report mentions that members of the unit suspected that they had been exposed to Iraqi chemical weapons, which had been carried by the wind back from Iranian lines, a common enough occurrence in the conflict by that point. As the Iran-Iraq War entered its latter stages, and Iraq dramatically increased its use of chemical weapons, even incorporating them into its combined arms strategy for offensive operations, this kind of training exercise remained relevant.

, where the Iraqi military was battling both Iranian military units and Peshmerga fighters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under Jalal Talabani. The file contains plans from the General Military Intelligence Directorate related to chemical strikes using Iraqi artillery, helicopters, and aircraft. In targeting the more remote mountain bases used by Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish forces, one diplomatic consideration was the use of chemical weapons in proximity to Iraq鈥檚 international border with Turkey. Another consideration was geography and the expressed preference for low-lying targets, where poison gas would be more effective.听

Noting that Iraq was facing shortages in its chemical weapons stockpiles, undoubtedly related to its extensive use of them by this stage in the war, one report recommended the use of mustard gas with ricin since winter conditions were unsuitable for the use of tabun and sarin nerve gas. In , likely of a meeting that took place during the late-1980s, Saddam boasts of Iraq鈥檚 chemical weapons capability and suggests that they should share this knowledge with the Arab world, stating, 鈥淚t is impossible for all the Arabs to have鈥� to have reached the stage we did as far as quantity and quality鈥� it is happening by tons.鈥�

Saddam鈥檚 Views of the Iran-Iraq War

Other records provide valuable insights into Saddam鈥檚 view of developments in the Iran-Iraq War.听, Saddam strikes an upbeat tone when discussing Iran鈥檚 southern offensive, explaining that even if Iranian forces were to capture Basra, 鈥渋t wouldn鈥檛 be the end of the world.鈥澛�

The same tape provides insight on the subsequent聽 in northern Iraq, where Saddam mentions that his cousin聽 had been given full authority to take military actions as needed, eliminating the need for constant communication with Baghdad.听

Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War and the completion of the Anfal campaigns, Saddam and his advisers through a modernization theory-like lens, articulating a kind of Ba士thist聽, especially with respect to the region鈥檚 restive Kurdish population. Saddam declared, 鈥渋t becomes our responsibility to he who lives by the gun for a long time and is accustomed to it, to instead teach him to work, step by step.鈥澛�

Saddam and the United States

was recorded in the aftermath of the May 17, 1987,聽, which killed 37 and wounded 21 and occurred against the backdrop of the聽 between Iraq and Iran. Along with a general sense of relief that the American diplomatic response had been 鈥渂alanced and normal,鈥� Saddam and his advisers discussed increased coordination with the United States to ensure that a similar mistake did not take place again.

, after Iraq鈥檚 decisive recapture of the Faw peninsula, Saddam and his military commanders discussed recent American naval operations in the Gulf against Iran, along with the proximity of the US Navy to the Faw peninsula during Iraq鈥檚 operations to recapture it, which they viewed with suspicion.

Even as the bloody Iran-Iraq War neared its conclusion, Saddam remained fearful of its further internationalization. In the same meeting 聽Saddam described聽 as 鈥渂ipolar,鈥� he also stated, 鈥渢he situation is dangerous. Any spark right now could cause a world war.鈥澛�

Saddam鈥檚 alarmist thinking had been bolstered by the revelation of the聽 in November 1986, a development he interpreted as confirming his suspicions that Iran, Israel, and the United States had been conspiring against him and Iraq all along. After 鈥淚rangate,鈥� as Saddam and his inner circle called the scandal in a homage to Watergate, past failures of US intelligence to warn Iraq against Iranian offensives were viewed as part of the plan to help Iran win the war. During that likely took place in late-1988, Saddam expressed the opinion that a recent assassination attempt against him had been the handiwork of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). As he told those gathered, 鈥淚t is鈥攎y conviction. I don't have information. Nobody told me. I have a strong feeling that they were behind it.鈥澛�

Saddam鈥檚 view of the CIA as omnipotent permeated every level of the Ba士th Party and its intelligence services. prepared by the General Military Intelligence Directorate on US intelligence agencies explained, 鈥淓very project conducted by the Americans outside of America is conducted by the CIA.鈥�

Saddam鈥檚 perceptions of聽 directly influenced聽 on August 2, 1990. In with officials he said, 鈥淎merica had decided to attack Iraq before August 2nd,鈥� and announced, 鈥渢he main battle started before Kuwait鈥� What happened on 8/2 was a reaction to this sweeping plan. America wants to control the whole region together with Israel and do whatever is to their liking. Iraq had uncovered this plan very clearly.鈥澛燬addam鈥檚 fear of the CIA only grew as Iraq came into direct military conflict with the United States.听, the General Military Intelligence Directorate forwarded reports that CIA and Israeli Mossad teams had infiltrated Baghdad to assassinate Saddam and the Ba士th Party鈥檚 leadership.听

After Saddam remained in power despite Iraq鈥檚 disastrous military defeat in Kuwait that sparked internal uprisings, events years later were seen in similar terms, for both real and imagined reasons. Aware of the fact that the U.S.-led coalition had targeted him during the air campaign of Operation Desert Storm, Saddam was unaware but could have imagined that President George H.W. Bush also issued a directive to the CIA to work toward the overthrow of his regime. In 1995, after聽 working in Kuwait accidentally crossed the border into Iraq and were detained as a potential pretext for the United States to attack Iraq or assassinate Saddam. Despite Iraq鈥檚 heavy losses in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, in from this period, Saddam claimed the Iraqi military was stronger for having survived the US-led coalition onslaught.听 urging Iraqis to prepare for renewed conflict with the United States he declared, 鈥渢he goal of the enemies has become clear after ten years of war and ten years of blockade.鈥�

International Sanctions Between Wars, 1991-2003

This third batch of records also contains documents from the period of international sanctions against Iraq between the 1991 and 2003 wars.听

The most interesting is a聽 containing the minutes of a February 4, 1998, meeting between Iraqi and French officials. Leading the French delegation as聽 personal envoy,聽 delivered a letter from the president to Saddam and explained, 鈥淚 met with Mr. Jacques Chirac on Monday morning; he asked me to deliver the letter to you personally鈥� He currently considers France聽to be the country trying to alleviate the American pressure, and provide the most possible assistance to Iraq.鈥澛�

罢丑别听, established three years prior in 1995, had ostensibly allowed Iraq to sell oil on the international market in exchange for humanitarian supplies. In practice, the program became a major conduit for corruption that Saddam鈥檚 regime exploited to its advantage. Nevertheless, Iraq鈥檚 coffers were still tied to the price of oil. In light of US lobbying for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to increase production, a September 2000 proposal from聽 a presidential adviser who was previously the father of Iraq鈥檚 nuclear weapons program, advocated for Iraq to correspondingly cut oil production to stabilize the price .

Saddam鈥檚 Family

Finally, this release features from Saddam鈥檚 half-brother聽, who after running the Mukhabarat as Saddam and the Ba士th Party consolidated power, later fell out of favor and went abroad to become Iraq鈥檚 representative to the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. Despite being written by Barzan and sent to Saddam nearly a decade apart, both letters report incidents and include complaints about the behavior of Saddam鈥檚聽.听

As in the case with the other records introduced here, readers of Steve Coll鈥檚 The Achilles Trap聽will recognize the appearance of their contents in the book鈥檚 narrative and can reference them with the endnote citations included with the metadata for each.